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THE TEACHING OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AND INVESTMENT LAW IN A "LAW AND




A symposium on teaching "Law" in the context of development is
appropriate at this time for many reasons. There are, however, two major
reasons in this writer's view. The first is that it is an appropriate time to
reflect on the thinking of the 1960s and 70s on the subject and see what
can be learned from that for future planning. Secondly, it comes at a
time when developmental issues have been made more urgent by the
stagnation resulting from the stress of external debt in developing coun-
tries.
The reality of underdevelopment in an international capitalist system
is deeply affecting populations in many developing countries, in Africa
and elsewhere, probably more forcefully than ever before. The interna-
tional debt crisis has increased the International Monetary Fund's control
over capital flows to developing countries. Having lost their creditwor-
thiness, most of these countries are squirming under the conditions set by
the International Monetary Fund. Despite assurances that the Fund and
its conditions are the appropriate medication for the economic ills currently
being experienced, it is without doubt a bitter medicine. Signs of healing
are hard to find, in spite of the fact that the medicine has been admin-
istered for a long time in most cases. The reality of perpetual poverty
and squalor has never been so real for most developing countries of
Africa.
What is involved in teaching law under these circumstances? It is to
teach law in a manner relevant to the situation of underdevelopment. For
* Lecturer, University of Zambia, School of Law. LL.B. (Zambia); LL.M. S.J.D. (University
of Wisconsin, Madison).
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those who have made the choice, it is to employ one's legal skills to the
finding of solutions to the gigantic problem of underdevelopment.
Addressing the Law Society of Zambia on "the functions of a lawyer
in Zambia today" (in 1970), President David Kenneth Kaunda stated that
"the law of any society must inevitably reflect the character and needs
of that society."' It is amazing how this statement, made in the municipal
law context, summarizes the law and development perspective in inter-
national law terms. International law (including international trade and
investment law) has been correctly referred to as "European law ' 2 because
it has evolved from the interaction of the modern European states from
the fifteenth century onwards. Modern African societies participated (if
it can be called participation at all) in the formation of international law
as appendices of their metropolitan colonial ruling states of Europe. It is
undebatable, therefore, that conventional international law and jurispru-
dence are unrepresentative of modern African states. This is true of other
developing countries generally.
The emancipation of many colonial territories in this century, including
most of Africa, prompted the emergence of many new states. Most of
them were ill equipped to take over the responsibility of managing their
political and economic affairs. Colonialism robbed them, not only of their
mineral wealth, but also of their confidence as dignified, capable peoples.
To mention their unpreparedness to take over the political and economic
responsibilities of their territories is not to chide them, but to visualize
the brutality of colonialism.
The world today is not Europe and the United States only, but also
these many poor countries. The character of the world and the needs of
the international community have changed. This "European law" must
change as well. International law is bound to be archaic and obsolete in
so far as it fails to adapt itself to the changed character of the new
community it is supposed to serve. To so adapt it has to address itself to
the issue of development. The word "development" summarizes the need
of the developing world. In a sense it also reflects the needs of the
"developed" world.
Law and development is a perspective that looks at law in the context
of the development process. It emphasizes the social engineering role of
1972).
1. Kaunda, The Functions of the Lawyer in Zambia Today, 3-4 ZAMBIA L. J. 1-4 (1971 &
2. H. J. STEINER & D. F. VACTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 329 (2d ed. 1976).
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law, 3 albeit not at the expense of its other roles, notably that of control.
At the international level, we may not necessarily talk of "social engi-
neering," but there exists an equivalent role for international law to hasten
change to a system and rules reflecting the new composition and needs
of the international community of states. The need for law to play this
role at the international level may be even more acute, due to the
predominance of power politics. This is evident from what follows.
This paper assumes that international law is Law, and does not,
therefore, attempt to establish this. Development in the context of this
paper refers to the process of economic, social, political and cultural
advancement that countries traditionally referred to as "developing" are
striving to achieve. To go into the technical ramification of the term
"development" is not within the competence of this writer.
International Trade Law and Development
To understand the international legal framework and substantive in-
ternational trade law, students have to appreciate the philosophical di-
mension. Law implements philosophy. This is true of the current
international trade law based on the laissez faire philosophy. Students
have to understand the theory of free trade and its compatriot, the
doctrine of comparative advantage, and their intended objectives. The
division of labour or specialization as advocated by these theories, is
examined, in this paper, in the light of the intended objectives. The
analysis of these theories is accompanied by an appraisal of the reasons
or rationale for their adoption. The rationale of maximization of trade
and efficiency in achieving the general objective of increasing the wealth
of nations are important among these. This objective has, however,
become an illusion for developing countries in spite of the trade and
development connection. The teaching of international trade and invest-
ment law in the context of development, therefore, has to question the
adequacy of the theory of free trade to cater for developmental require-
ments of developing countries. Consequently, there is great motivation
not to be preoccupied with theory, but instead to analyze the actual
working of these theories in the real world.
Competition is the cornerstone of laissez faire. A theory that advocates
allocation of resources on the basis of competition assumes that there
3. Ocran, Law, African Economic Development & Social Engineering: A Theoretical Nexus,
3-4 ZAMBiA L. J. 14-42 (1971 & 1972).
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exists "out there" among the participants an equality of economic power
to compete. The most favoured nation clause in the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (hereinafter GATT or the Agreement) assumes this
equality, 4 but the international community does not consist of states with
equal economic power. The "survival of the fittest" philosophy enshrined
in GATT is bound to be biased against the poor and weak. History tends
to confirm the view that the weak are disadvantaged under the system.
The United Kingdom was the champion of the laissez faire philosophy
in the 19th century. It could afford to be, having an empire of colonies
that supported its economy as markets for its goods and as suppliers of
cheap raw materials. The United States of America within the same period
preferred a protectionist approach, as it was still building its infant
industries following its independence and the Civil War. In the 20th
century, especially the latter part, tables have turned.' Especially under
Reagan, the United States is the protagonist of the market philosophy,
while Britain and Europe, having lost their colonies, are constantly being
accused by their ally of being protective, particularly in the agricultural
sector.
This makes sense because Europe and Japan were ravaged by the
Second World War. It was the Marshall Plan that helped Europe and
Japan gain their economic strength. Through the Marshall Plan the United
States of America poured about 95070 of its aid into Europe. European
currencies were not convertible until late in the 1950s. 6 This substantial
aid was, inter alia, in recognition of the fact that the operation of the
international economic system on the basis of the market philosophy
required strong participants in Europe and Japan.
Between Europe, the United States of America (USA) and Japan, the
GATT framework makes sense. Contracting parties with equivalent eco-
nomic bargaining strength regularly meet at conferences to negotiate for
the reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade among themselves.
These are generalized through the most favoured nation-clause. There is
some kind of equity achieved in this kind of atmosphere.
When the scene changes and developing contracting parties enter, the
framework ceases to make sense. The young nations do not have the
necessary concessions to offer in order to assist them to extract concessions
4. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. 1, para. 1, 61 Stat. A12,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700.
5. Steiner & Vagts, supra note 2.
6. R. H. MASON, R. R. MILLER & D. R. WEIGEL, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS (3d ed. 1981).
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from developed countries; further, their interests are different and are
diametrically opposed to those of the dominant parties. They find them-
selves having to negotiate with their previous metropolitan rulers on the
same level, and of course they do not have the same economic power or
expertise. The lack of concessions to offer on the bilateral basis means
developing countries cannot obtain meaningful tariff reductions on prod-
ucts of relevance and importance to their economies.
The fact that a customs union (instead of its constituent members 7) is
regarded as the contracting party to the GATT also limits the benefits of
the Agreement to developing countries. Article XXIV of the GATT
organizes the developed-country parties to the Agreement into the Euro-
pean Economic Community (EEC), the USA and Japan. This block
membership further concentrates their negotiating strength, while it reduces
the significance of developing countries in GATT. Once the EEC, the
USA and Japan have satisfied their interests, there is no incentive for
them to deal with the unique problems of developing countries.
Exceptions, under which developing countries may apply for exemp-
tions from some GATT obligations, are also of limited benefit to these
countries. For example, a member may apply for an exemption from the
rule prohibiting application of quantitative restrictions, for balance of
payments reasons. However, if any contracting party establishes prima
facie that the restrictions are inconsistent with article XII, and that their
application adversely affects its trade and if previous negotiations between
the applying and affected party have not been successful, the contracting
parties are required to invite the applying party to consult with them. If
the contracting parties find such restrictions inconsistent with the article
and no agreement is arrived at, they shall recommend withdrawal of such
restrictions, at the pain of retaliation. The same applies to restrictions
that may be applied under the article relating to government assistance to
economic development.' In the latter case, the ultimate remedy for the
country applying the restrictions may be withdrawal from GATT.
Consultation and retaliation are the normal modes of settling disputes
under GATT, but retaliation by a developing country against any of the
developed-block members of GATT is ineffective. Developing countries
are not, therefore, in a position to enforce their interests under GATT.
7. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XXIV, para. 1, 61 Stat. A66, T.I.A.S.
No. 1700.
8. Id., art. XViii, para. 12(d).
THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES-1987
Furthermore, free trade and comparative advantage force developing
countries to continue in their role of supplying raw materials, whose
prices in the international market are extremely unstable and low. Export
earnings from commodity trade fall far short of those required to carry
out the development needs of the poor countries. The trade and devel-
opment connection under GATT is weak.
Part IV of GATT was meant to remedy these problems by introducing
the "commitments without reciprocity" principle for developing countries.
However, the commitments under this section are dubious and uncertain,
having been abrogated by an exception of "compelling reasons, which
may include legal reasons, ' 9 and the fact that adoption of these measures
"shall be a matter of conscious and purposeful effort on the part of
contracting parties." 10
To free themselves from the philosophical straitjacket of GATT,
developing countries strongly advocated the creation of the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in the General As-
sembly. UNCTAD was formed in 1964. Although UNCTAD's success is
sometimes said to be the result of its function as a forum for developing
countries as commodity traders, its underlying spirit is development through
industrialization. 1 This spirit gave rise to the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP) whose aim is to open up developed countries' markets
to manufactured products from developing countries.
Although the GSP is UNCTAD's most tangible success story, the
scheme has had its own share of problems. Naturally, it received mixed
reactions among developed countries because it was introducing a non-
reciprocal exception to the most favoured nation clause under GATT.
Due to lack of agreement on its provisions, the various blocks of developed
countries formulated and applied their own schemes along the lines of
the proposed one. Some, like the USA and Canada, did not implement
their own miniature schemes. The scheme's general effect has further been
reduced by the distinction made by the developed countries between
developed developing countries and the least developed. The overall effect
has also been limited by the application of quantitative restrictions in
conjunction with ceiling rates, and other restrictions placed by donor
countries to protect their markets. 2
9. Id., art. XXXVI, para. 9.
10. Id., art. XXXVII.
11. J. PINCUS, TRADE, AID AND DEVELOPMENT: THE RICH AND THE POOR NATIONS (1967).
12. Murray, UNCTAD's Generalized Preferences: An Appraisal, 7 J. WORLD TRADE L. 461
(1973). See also Walters, UNCTAD: Intervener Between Poor and Rich States, 7 J. WORLD TRADE
L. 527 (1973).
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The GSP applies to manufactured goods. It excludes the processed
agricultural and fishery products in which developing countries have a
comparative advantage. Other semi-manufactured goods, in which these
countries would perform better, are excluded for the protection of donor
countries' markets. Consequently, its effect is severely limited. 3
The effort to diversify under UNCTAD has been at the expense of
developing countries' traditional exports. The main objective of interna-
tional commodity agreements is to stabilize commodity prices through
avoidance of excess production and through price margins agreed between
exporters and importers. The importing power of developed countries is
also felt here. Under the International Wheat Agreement, for example,
importers have no obligation towards exporting countries if the price falls
below the agreed-upon minimum, and importing countries are free to
purchase wheat elsewhere when prices exceed the agreed upon maximum
price.
International Investment Law
The philosophical underpinnings of GATT's relationship with devel-
oping contracting parties have dogged these countries in the field of
investment law too. The confrontation here has been intense, due to the
fact that investment has a more immediate impact on the host state's
political economy. The confrontation has been epitomized through the
issues of nationalization and compensation for nationalization. The USA
has been at the forefront in resisting change in this field, but its views
are generally shared in the developed world.
Whereas the USA accepts that the act of nationalization (expropria-
tion) is within the competence of a sovereign state, it insists that it has
to be accompanied by prompt, adequate and effective compensation to
be lawful under international law. It maintains that there is an interna-
tional minimum standard, to which the treatment of aliens should conform
regardless of the treatment accorded nationals.
A survey14 of the USA's voting pattern in the General Assembly on
the issue of permanent sovereignty over natural resources reveals that
country's stand on this matter: there is no sovereign right in the host
state to secure and increase its share in the administration of foreign
investment. Neither does the USA believe that a host state has a sovereign
13. Id.
14. This summary of the U.S.A.'s views is compiled from excerpts of explanations of objections
in Steiner & Vagts, supra note 2.
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right to secure and increase its share in the profits and advantages derived
from the exploitation of the permanent natural resources when it is
exploited by foreign capital. The developed world also opposes the view
expressed in the 1973 General Assembly resolution to the effect that "the
expression of their sovereignty. . .implies that each state is entitled to
determine the amount of possible compensation, and the mode of pay-
ment, and that any dispute which might arise should be settled in accor-
dance with the national legislation of each state carrying out such
measure."' 5 Objection was also expressed against the General Assembly
Resolution on the establishment of a New International Economic Order
referring to the principle of
[flull permanent sovereignty of every state over its natural resources
and full economic activities. In order to safeguard these resources,
each State is entitled to exercise effective control over them and their
exploitation with means suitable to its own situation, including the
right to nationalization or transfer of ownership to its nationals, this
right being an expression of the full permanent sovereignty of the
State. No State may be subjected to economic, political or any other
type of coercion to prevent the free and full exercise of this inalienable
right . .. 16
The USA objected to the lack of a provision requiring compensation.
These views should be contrasted with those acceptable to the USA
in the 1962 Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources,
which acknowledged: "The right of peoples and nations to permanent
sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources must be exercised in
the interest of their national development and of the well-being of the
people of the state concerned.' 1 7 It also stated that the exploration and
disposition of the resources and the importation of foreign capital for
this purpose "should be in conformity with the rules and conditions which
the peoples and nations freely consider to be necessary or desirable with
regard to the authorization, restriction or prohibition of such activities."' 8
15. Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, United Nations, General
Assembly, Res. 3171, adopted 17 December 1973. U.N. Doc. A/RES/3171 (XXVI) (1974). See 13
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 238 (1974).
16. Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, U. N. G.. A.
Res. 3201, art. 4(c), adopted 1 May 1974. U.N. Doc. A/RES/3201 (S)VI) (1974). See 13 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 715 (1974).
17. Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, U. N. G. A. Res. 1803,
adopted 4 December 1962. U.N. Doc. A/RES/1803 (XVIII) (1962). See 2 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
223 (1963).
18. Id.
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It further provided that when such authorization for the importation of
foreign capital is granted, the earnings on that capital shall be governed
by the terms thereof, by the national legislation in force, and by inter-
national law, 19 and Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall
be based on grounds or reasons of public utility, security or the national
interest which are recognized as overriding purely individual or private
interests, both domestic and foreign. In such cases, the owner shall be
paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with the rules in force in
the State taking such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and in
accordance with international law. ' '20
The views of the developing world can be summarized from the
exchange between the USA and some Latin American states on nation-
alizations in the latter. These views are the so-called national treatment
principle, generally referred to as the Calvo doctrine. 2' This principle states
that foreign investors voluntarily accept treatment similar to that accorded
nationals on entering a host state. Consequently, foreign investors are not
entitled to compensation when nationalization is general and of impersonal
(i.e. non-discriminatory) nature. They are so entitled only if nationals are
also given compensation under the same circumstances. Other developing
countries, while accepting the general principle of compensation, have
included other variables considered relevant in the calculation of profits
of the investment. Chile under Allende, for example, insisted on deduction
of previous excess profits earned by the companies in comparison with
normal profitability earned in their international operations. This variable
aims at recouping profits that might have been earned through concen-
trating on high grade ore, for example. Chile also wanted to deduct from
profits revaluations in anticipation of the nationalizations.
The practice in Africa generally has been that nationalization is done
under investment agreements between host states and individual investors
which spell out the terms of the nationalization. This is as opposed to
decrees abolishing private ownership as such. The former approach was
employed in Zambia where the government, through a wholly owned
enterprise, negotiated and entered into various forms of agreements with
foreign investors. These nationalizations were carried out under the In-
dependence Constitution. This constitution 22 prohibited compulsory taking
19. Id. at 1(3).
20. Id. at 1(4).
21. See Steiner & Vagts, supra note 2.
22. Zambia, Parliament, The Independence Constitution of Zambia, S. 18.
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of property except for defense, public utility and development, and the
law authorizing the taking was required to provide for prompt payment
of adequate compensation. The constitution further required provision
for access by the investor to a court of law or other authority for
determination of the legality of the taking, the investor's interest so
nationalized and the determination of the amount of compensation where
there was disagreement.
The current Zambian constitution permits expropriation under an Act
of Parliament which Act must provide for compensation for such expro-
priation, or taking of interest in, or right over, property. Such an Act of
Parliament shall state principles on which compensation is to be deter-
mined. The Act shall also provide that in default of agreement, compen-
sation is to be determined by the National Assembly. 23 Compensation so
determined by the National Assembly is not questionable in a court of
law on the grounds of inadequacy. Zambia also has an Arbitration Act
which has been incorporated in a number of nationalization agreements.24
Issues relating to expropriation are extremely important to developing
countries because they affect their economic self- determination. It is
indisputable that every sovereign state has, under international law, the
right to control its economy and economic destiny. A notable writer on
international law has stated, regarding territorial sovereignty, that
[olne of the essential elements of statehood is the occupation of a
territorial area within which state law operates. Over this area, supreme
authority is vested in the state .... hence there arises the concept of
territorial sovereignty which signifies that within this territorial domain
jurisdiction is exercised by the state over persons and property to the
exclusion of other states. 25
Of course there are qualifications to this rule, but it is the primary
principle of international law on this matter.
Examining the 1962 resolution acceptable to the USA, one can justi-
fiably argue that subsequent General Assembly resolutions, which the
USA found repugnant, are mere amplifications of that resolution, except
for the reference to international law and compensation. That resolution
acknowledged permanent sovereignty over natural resources as a principle
23. The National Assembly is composed of elected members of Parliament (125), and 10
members nominated by the President. The National Assembly and the President (for purposes of
signing bills) constitute Parliament.
24. Zambia, Parliament, The Arbitration Act of Zambia, Chap. 180, LAWS OF ZAMBIA.
25. J.G. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 152 (9th ed. 1984).
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of international law and that these resources should be administered in
the interests of the peoples (i.e. States) who own them. How can this be
achieved, if host states do not have the right to participate in the
administration and profits from the exploitation of such resources, and
if they do not have the right to exercise effective control over them?
The amplifications made by subsequent General Assembly resolutions
in effect add flesh to the 1962 resolution by stating that host states have
the sovereign right to control foreign investment effectively so that their
economies, and therefore their peoples, may benefit from it. This control
in practice is effected through rules, restrictions and conditions placed on
foreign investors on entering host states. Generally, these rules and res-
trictions take the form of requirements of indigenous share participation
in foreign enterprises, restrictions on repatriation of profits, restrictions
on areas of participation in host states' economics and requirements
regarding filing of certain information with a monitoring government
agency. The totality of these rules and regulations gives host states control
over foreign investment in their territories. It is accepted by resolutions
subsequent to that of 1962 that for any meaningful benefits from foreign
investment to accrue to a developing host state such restrictions and
regulations are necessary, and the history of foreign investment in these
countries tends to confirm this. The USA's acceptance and affirmation
of the indisputable principle of international law that foreign capital enters
host states subject to rules, restrictions and conditions that may be placed
upon it on entry, therefore, is an acceptance of developing countries'
sovereign right to control foreign investment in the above sense. It is this
writer's understanding of these resolutions that any such rules and res-
trictions which result in a more equitable sharing of the benefits of foreign
investment between foreign investors and host states is within the purview
of all these resolutions, including the 1962 one, and therefore, in accor-
dance with international law.
The USA's objection to these resolutions is not so much with the
verity of their substance as with their ideological implications, because
control is diametrically opposed to the theory of free trade or laissez
faire.
Looking at the USA's objections stated above, one is prompted
earnestly to ask: What remains of developing countries' state sovereignty
if the U.S. position is international law? The answer is nothing. The effect
of the USA's position is to place, superficially private investment, but
effectively all foreign investment above the interests of nationals of
developing countries. Consequently, this allows for developed countries'
continued exploitation of these countries. There is no international law
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principle that subjects the rights of nationals to those of aliens.
The USA's position is that the "international law" in relation to the
earnings of foreign capital and compensation in the 1962 resolution refers
to the principle of prompt, adequate and effective position, i.e. that this
is a binding principle of international law. This position prima facie
supports the principle of an international minimum standard in the
treatment of foreign investors by a host state. This might have been the
principle then, but it is questionable whether this is still the prevailing
international law principle.
The issue boils down to the extent to which the above discussed United
Nations resolutions can be said to have either influenced or effected
change of customary international law in this area. Before dealing with
this highly debatable issue, it is important to point out that the principle
of prompt, adequate and effective compensation primarily evolved from
developed countries' expropriation of their nationals' property for public
utility reasons. This is because compensation for expropriation has never
been an issue among developed countries inter se considering the relative
parity in the flow of capital between them. The appropriateness of applying
a principle formulated purely on municipal law considerations to an
international situation involving other sovereign states with their own
ideological variant is highly questionable. Consequently, UN resolutions
on this matter constitute and illustrate the failure of this primarily Western
principle to gain acceptance as a principle of international law in the new
international community. Alternatively, the new nations of the current
international community have not accepted this old international law
principle. Either way, the rejection of this principle has been effective.
The current issue is whether the above resolutions constitute the new
consensus as advocated by the new element or another consensus has yet
to come.
It is this writer's view that the resolutions above discussed constitute
the new international principle on this matter because they are consistent
with the principle of state sovereignty, which is the cornerstone of inter-
national law.
The fact that the USA has perpetrated its views, in international
agreements like treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation and
through conditional aid under its own legislation such as the Hickenlooper
Amendment 6 to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, does not prove its
26. See Steiner & Vagts, supra note 2.
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case. This fact merely proves might as an economic and military power.
It is obvious from the objections of the developed countries against
effective control of foreign investment that they believe that mere foreign
participation in a developing political economy bestows sufficient benefits
to warrant its admission. This has been a persistent line that has been
used to intimidate developing countries to open their economies to foreign
investment and to subsidize it heavily through incentives. This view,
however, ignores the idiosyncracies of the political economy of developing
countries that give rise to different results from foreign investment par-
ticipation in a developed country.
The Internal Effort
International trade and investment law, issues the writer has come to
term "issues of sharing," is fertile ground for a law and development
perspective. Capital inflow and technology are only two of the ingredients
required for development. They are very essential ingredients, however.
They are also in short supply in developing countries. The challenge for
developing countries in international transactions was aptly stated by
UNCTAD in the following words:
In the long run, the success of a developing country in servicing its
indebtedness depends primarily on the contribution that capital inflows
make to the country's growing income stream, and on the country's
ability to capture from that income stream a volume of savings
adequate to service debt and to support its development programme.",
As regards technology, this writer came to the following conclusion:
Through the course of this study, it has become clear that if ranking
has to be done, transfer of foreign technology supercedes capital inflow
in essentiality, although these two are intertwined. By legally transferring
the control of the economy to Zambians in the Mulungushi policy
statement,the government made indigenous capability to manage the
economy a priority goal above any other. 28
Both capital and technology are transmitted through international trans-
actions, particularly foreign investment contracts. Investment law in the
context of development, therefore, is to strive at increasing a developing
27. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEVELOPMENT, DEBT PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
REPORT 5, U.N. Doc. TD/118/supp. 6/rev. 1, U.N. Sales No. E.72.II.D.12 (1972).
28. M. B. Kamuwanga, Legal Issues Involved in Negotiating Investment Contracts Between
Developing Countries and Foreign Investors: An example from Zambia 330 (S.J.D. Dissertation,
University of Wisconsin - Madison, 1985).
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country's quid pro quo, to effect genuine transfer of technology, to
localize the settlement of disputes arising therefrom and to provide for a
positive impact of foreign investment on the local economy generally in
a way that enhances the economic self-determination of the country. To
achieve this objective, there is need to bring about an awareness that the
allocating process is not inflexible and that internal effort can be made
to achieve this objective. This awareness is necessary not only among the
students of Investment Law, but also among the bureaucrats who are
responsible for the local decision-making process relating to foreign in-
vestment entry into the country.
This educational effort is necessary because developing countries have
for a long time preoccupied themselves with attracting foreign investment
through incentives. That foreign investment is a necessary evil in the
development process is not debatable. The mindset of many of these
countries is, however, that foreign investment per se is beneficial to a
developing country. The question that needs to be analysed is whether
the instance of foreign capital investment by itself is prima facie beneficial
to a developing country. Developed countries have advocated this view
over the years.
A behavioural study of multinational corporations, however, strongly
suggests otherwise. Apart from their undesirable impact on the social
fabric of developing countries' societies, their impact on the host state's
balance of payments position is debatable. 29 Their notorious practices of
transfer pricing, tax evasion and tax avoidance, etc., may result in
decapitalization of a developing country which does not have sufficient
sophistication or staffing to detect and stop these practices. Genuine
transfer of technology is hindered by multinationals' insistence on complete
management control of their investments, sometimes at the pain of with-
drawal. Even when joint ventures are accepted, their "satellization" 30
through contract provisions neutralizes their effectiveness in effecting
transfer of technology.
To deal with the problem of possible decapitalization and an inade-
quate quid pro quo, there is need for a developing country to screen
29. See for example, R. J. BARNET & R. E. MILLER, THE GLOBAL REACH: THE POWER OF THE
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS (1974).
30. M. WIONCZEK, MEASURES STRENGTHENING THE NEGOTIATING CAPACITY OF GOVERNMENTS
IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS: TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER THROUGH
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS - A TECHNICAL PAPER U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/11, U.N. Sales No.
E.79.II.A.6 (1979).
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foreign investment admitted in its territory and thereafter to monitor its
operations effectively.
The screening period starts with the bureaucrats who are in a position
to place conditions and terms of entry on foreign investment. In Zambia
this is done by the Investment Coordinating Committee.3 The negotiation
done at this stage gives officials involved opportunity to incorporate the
country's economic policy and priorities in the entry agreement. The
continued operation of the investment in the country is made conditional
on the observance of the conditions and terms so agreed upon by the
Investment Act.32
The second stage of screening is at the micro level if the investment
is a joint venture. The screening process spreads over the negotiations on
the terms of the joint venture contract. It is this contract which generally
allocates benefits and liabilities relating to the investment among partners.
Negotiators are well placed to weigh offers from a foreign investor and
to assess their beneficence to them as partners and to the country generally.
An inadequate bargain should be rejected at this stage.
Developing countries have, however, for a long time, treated the
negotiating process as a matter of formality. They have left to the foreign
investor the responsibility of drafting the legal instruments, leaving to
their own lawyers only the responsibility of turning pages for the appro-
priate government official to affix his signature. This attitude is suicidal
and should be discontinued.
There are three main explanations for this attitude. The first is that
lawyers trained or specialized in international transactions are few. When
they are available, they may not be fully utilized because of the attitude
still predominant in many developing countries that a lawyer's function
is the traditional role as a defender of rights in litigation. This old-
fashioned view prevents the effective utilization of lawyers generally in
the development process and in matters of international transactions in
particular. The third explanation is that political leaders usually prefer
foreign experts as being more competent than indigenous ones. This is a
crisis in self-confidence that is proving to be one of the greatest success
stories of colonialism. So even when legal opinion is sought, it is sought
from overseas. Yet, the foreign lawyers often trusted with the responsibility
31. This Committee is constituted by the Investment Act of 1986. It has the primary responsibility
of processing and approving applications from investors to invest in the country.
32. Zambia, Parliament, Investment Act (No. 5) of 1986, S. 20.
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of advising in these transactions are usually handicapped by their lack of
understanding of their client's political economy.
A trade and investment curriculum to train development lawyers,
therefore, has to be more than a law course because it has to be taught
in the context of the country's political economy. The political dimension
is important because it constitutes the environmental context. Political
risk analysis has become an important factor in foreign investment deci-
sion-making. Economic policy usually demarcates the area of participation
of foreign investment in the local economy. It also provides the rationale
for restrictions placed on foreign investment participation and why these
are necessary for the achievement of stated national goals.
Being in tune with the country's political and economic aspirations, a
foreign investment lawyer is better placed to negotiate them into the
investment contract. Having been involved in the negotiations, she is able
to capture the spirit of the negotiating process and incorporate it into
legal language to express adequately the needs and aspirations of the
country. After having participated in the drafting and execution of the
investment contract, a lawyer is better placed to participate, when neces-
sary, in the carrying out of the project in the form of provision of legal
opinion or interpretation. This further gives a lawyer the opportunity to
gain relevant experience and better incorporate the country's aspirations
in future investment contracts.
Empirical Evidence of the Injustice of the International System
The philosophical hurdles for developing countries are equally pro-
nounced in the international financial system. A smooth capital flow to
the developing countries is important to facilitate productive investment.
The terms of lending have a bearing on the net resource transfer to
developing countries. This has been amply demonstrated by developing
countries' experiences in the 1975-85 decade.
After the 1973 oil crisis that was introduced by oil price hikes among
other things, developing countries have been experiencing problems of
acute shortage of capital for their development plans and lately for debt
servicing purposes. Their first reaction was to turn to the commercial
lenders to fill the gap. Commercial borrowing by these countries was
intensified in the late 1970s as official flows declined, reflecting adjust-
ments made by developed countries as they, too, wrestled with the
successive recessions.3 This created the opportunity for market forces
33. WORLD BANK, WORLD'S DEBT TABLES: EXTERNAL DEBT OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1983/
84 ed. 1984).
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predominantly to influence the distribution of resources among nations.
The result has been that developing countries, being acutely affected by
shortages of capital, were obliged to sign loan agreements with variable
interest rate clauses. The variable interest rate clause imported high interest
rates into these loans as developed countries contracted their money
supplies to curb inflation. Interest rate payments have become a large
component of developing country debt. The working of market forces
should have prevented over-lending either by lowering the demand for
borrowed capital because it was becoming too expensive, or by refusal by
lenders to over-expose themselves for fear of default by borrowers. As it
was, neither happened. Borrowers continued to borrow because they
needed capital, and lenders continued to lend because of the excess
liquidity they had. It would have been unprofitable for lenders to keep
their capital without earning interest on it. Consequently, the automatic
working of market forces failed to prevent over-lending as theory suggested
they would.
The international debt crisis has resulted in a reverse transfer of
resources. This will continue as charges on rescheduled debt multiply.
Objective analysis of the situation would seem to support the view that
"non-intervention in the market cannot apply when there is no more
market. There has to be some outside compulsory action to stop the drain
of resources, when that drain cannot be affected by any conceivable
internal adjustment by the debtor countries. ' 3 4
Apart from opening a few extra facilities of borrowing, which provided
opportunity for developing countries to place themselves in the noose of
conditionality, the International Monetary Fund has done nothing to cater
to the unique problems of underdevelopment of developing countries. It
expects developing countries to conform to Western economic theory that
has been tailored to suit Western developed countries. The over-emphasis
of the Fund on the external currency policy at the expense of other
relevant factors, is assisting in the decapitalization of developing countries
through unrealistic depreciation of their currencies. The IMF, through its
conditionality and its insensitivity to the political repercussions thereof, is
also destroying any rudiments of democratic institutions and values that
may have been germinating. The IMF's failure to comprehend the prob-
lems of developing countries is a classic example of the archaic nature of
34. Langoni, The Way Out of the Country Debt crisis, IMF ESSAY EUROMONEY, Oct. 1983, at
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the Bretton Woods system to cater for the changed international com-
munity of states.
Conclusion
The law and development perspective on international trade and
investment law is a critique of the international system's impact on the
development efforts of developing countries.
This paper has addressed a few issues which the writer considers
important to the teaching of law in development. There is sufficient
evidence to the effect that developing countries are swimming against the
philosophical and, consequently, the legal current in the international
system. UNCTAD has succeeded in breaking the myth of economic
equality of States in the international market, but it has failed to establish
non-reciprocity as a legal principle. The establishment of such a rule is
problematic in a system that requires reciprocity for the establishment of
a legal obligation. However, the international legal system has overlooked
the fact that many developing countries have given, albeit involuntarily,
through colonial exploitation. It is a valid point that there has been
transfer of resources from colonies to the metropolitan states. Aid given
to developing countries, so-called non-reciprocal measures under GATT
or elsewhere is legitimately restitution that developed countries owe poor
countries for the material and other forms of exploitation during many
years of colonialism.
The basic problem is, therefore, dealing with a system that legitimizes
exploitation without creating an obligation for redress. The General As-
sembly Resolution on the Establishment of the New International Eco-
nomic Order appropriately declares: "The right of all States, territories
and peoples under foreign occupation, alien and colonial domination or
apartheid to restitution and full compensation for the exploitation and
depletion of, and damages to, the natural resources and all other resources
of those States, territories and peoples. . .. "I'
The wrangle over nationalization and foreign investment participation
in developing countries can better be appreciated as part of the East/
West ideological competition only. The Western developed nations feel
that direct control (in this case of trade and investment) removes the
allocation of resources through market forces and ushers in the control-
35. Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, U. N. G. A.
Res. 3201, art. 4(f), adopted I May 1974. U.N. Doc. A/RES/3201 (S-VI) (1974). See 13 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 715 (1974).
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oriented socialist approach. Yet the poor developing countries cannot
afford not to institute some control measures to compensate for their
ineffective participation in a system that buttresses the interests of the
rich and economically powerful. The international debt crisis that has
subsisted since the beginning of this decade is proving that the very
survival of these countries is at stake, unless the sucking dry of these
countries legitimized by the international capitalist legal and economic
systems is deliberately stopped or abated.
As far as developing countries are concerned, their ideological labelling
based on whether or not their economies are based on control or on the
basis of the market ideology leaves them no room for the important
distinction between indigenous private investment and foreign private
investment in dealing with their developmental problems. This distinction
would give opportunity to developing countries to develop their private
enterprise without fear of external economic domination while at the same
time to remain clearly non-aligned in terms of the East/West confronta-
tion. Also, indigenous private investors would not feel afraid to excel
when measures are taken against foreign private investment.
In the quest for solutions to their developmental problems, developing
countries cannot abdicate the responsibility they have to themselves.
Internal efforts to seek solutions that have a positive overall impact at
both international and national levels cannot, therefore, be overempha-
sized. The writer is of the opinion that effective negotiating with foreign
investment is one such effort that many developing countries have yet to
exploit to the fullest. The vices of corruption, wastage and misuse of
resources (including human ones) and maladministration have to be gen-
uinely and consistently tackled. One of the greatest problems undermining
the development process, especially in Africa, is the lack of stable political
governments. History, in Africa, is proving that there cannot be economic
development without a genuine democratic political system whose goal is
to seek sincerely to improve the well-being of the people.
That the character of the international community has changed is not
debatable. The ultimate question for the international system to settle is
whether it will continue to ignore the new element in its community.
There is sufficient empirical evidence that supports a need for change,
for accommodation of the latecomers and the poor.
If this issue will be left to be settled in the fashion of the market
philosophy, the market philosophy will vindicate itself. But if so, at what
cost? What a mockery of the rule of law that is supposed to be synony-
mous with civilization! What a travesty of justice!

